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2Abstract
Silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants were ﬁrst introduced in the United States in the 1960s and immedi-
ately gained popularity among women seeking to augment or reconstruct their breasts. However, although
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had the authority to regulate medical devices since the 1970s,
breast implants were largely unregulated until concerns about a link between the devices and connective
tissue diseases surfaced in the early 1980s. In the subsequent years, thousands of plaintiﬀs prevailed against
implant manufacturers, leading to the bankruptcy of Dow Corning and a multi-million dollar class settle-
ment. Ultimately, the controversy resulted in a FDA ban on silicone breast implants in 1992 that still
survives today.
This paper examines the silicone breast implant controversy from the inception of silicone devices to the
current regulatory status of breast implants in the United States. Part I describes the early uses of silicone
and the introduction of silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants in the United States. Part II examines the regulatory
framework for medical devices that ultimately gave the FDA the authority to ban silicone breast implants.
Part III depicts the responses to the FDA’s decision from both proponents and opponents of the use of breast
implants. Parts IV and V present the scientiﬁc research concerning the safety of the devices. Finally, Part
VI examines the current developments regarding silicone implants, and Part VII provides some conclusions
for the future.
I.
Introduction
One need only turn on a television set to see numerous images of the “ideal” female body. Until recently
these images were just that – images of an ideal that was presumably obtained through genetics or celebrity
wealth that was outside the grasp of the average woman. Television is changing, however, and at the forefront
of this change is a new batch of reality makeover shows. Unlike the “old” makeover shows that changed an
individual’s hair, makeup and clothing to provide a new look or image, these shows are taking makeovers to
extreme lengths. Instead of providing a trip to the local boutique and beauty parlor, the shows oﬀer both
men and women the chance to meet with the country’s premier plastic surgeons to create a whole new body.
And included in almost every woman’s “makeover” experience is a breast augmentation procedure.
3The American Society of Plastic Surgeons (ASPS) expressed concern recently that these reality programs
may create unrealistic patient expectations.1 Rod Rohrich, MD, ASPS president, noted that “some patients
on these shows have unrealistic and, frankly, unhealthy expectations about what plastic surgery can do for
them.”2 It is not surprising that many individuals have unrealistic expectations regarding plastic surgery
given the way that the shows describe the potential for physical change. On the Extreme Makeover website,
the show purports to provide “a real life fairy tale in which [the show’s participants’] wishes come true, not
just to change their looks, but their lives and destinies.”3 Similarly, on the website for The Swan, a show in
which sixteen women are given extensive plastic surgery so that they may ultimately compete in a beauty
pageant, the website authors describe the show as oﬀering “women the incredible opportunity to undergo
physical, mental and emotional transformations with the help of a team of experts.”4
The popularity of these new shows is not surprising. Although the emergence of “reality” television shows
oﬀering cosmetic surgery is a recent phenomenon, the surgery itself (and the desire to change one’s appear-
ance) has been around for decades. Many women have had breast implant surgery since silicone gel-ﬁlled
breast implants were ﬁrst introduced. Early reports estimated that at least 50,000 women received implants
between 1962 and 1970, and, by 1992, the number had increased to approximately 150,000 women annually. 5
Recent estimates indicate that approximately 1-2 million women have had silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants.6
Moreover, despite the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 1992 ban on silicone breast implants, breast
1American Society of Plastic Surgeons, New Reality TV Programs Create Unhealthy, Unrealistic Expectations of Plastic
Surgery, at http://www.plasticsurgery.org/news room/press releases/New-Reality-TV-Programs-Create-Unhealthy-Unrealistic-Expectations.cfm
(March 30, 2004).
2Id.
3ABC Television, Extreme Makeover, show website, at http://abc.go.com/primetime/extrememakeover/show.html (last
visited April 22, 2004).
4Fox Broadcasting Company, The Swan, show website, at http://www.fox.com/swan/home.htm (last visited April 22, 2004).
5Institute of Medicine Committee on the Safety of Silicone Breast Implants, Safety of Silicone Breast Implants 31(Stuart
Bondurant, Virginia Ernster & Roger Herdman eds., 1999) [hereinafter Institute of Medicine]; Marcia Angell, Breast Implants—
Protection or Paternalism?, 326 New Eng. J. Med., 1695-96 (June 18, 1992).
6Jack W. Snyder, Silicone Breast Implants, 18 J. Legal Med. 133, 133 (June 1997).
4augmentation was still the third most common cosmetic operation in the US in [1994].7 Members of the
American Society of Plastic Surgeons performed 225,818 breast augmentation surgeries in 2002, compared
with 37,607 in 1992.8
The majority of women who choose to undergo breast implant surgery do so for augmentation reasons. Some
reports indicate that 34% of U.S. women are dissatisﬁed with their breasts, and more than half of breast
augmentation patients reported having frequently checked the appearance of their breasts and camouﬂaging
them.9 When Dow Corning ﬁrst introduced silicone breast implants to the US market in the 1960s, 98% of
women who underwent breast implant surgery did so to increase the size of their breasts.10 Recent studies
report that approximately 70% of implants are placed for augmentation purposes.11
Although the majority of women obtain implants for breast augmentation, the number of women who receive
implants for breast reconstruction is increasing. The number of women who received implants after mastec-
tomy, which had previously been low and stable, began to increase in 1975 and continued to increase over
the next two decades.12 In 1983, 3% of women received breast implants for reconstruction after undergoing
a mastectomy; by 1992, more than 25% received those implants.13 Reconstruction after mastectomy for
cancer, ﬁbrocystic disease, or other reasons is believed to provide a sense of having overcome disease and
may relieve or prevent a perception of loss, dissatisfaction, depression, and feelings of diminished sexual
attractiveness.14
As the above statistics indicate, breast implant surgery is prevalent in this country for both augmentation
7Marcia Angell, M.D., Science on Trial: The Clash of Medical Evidence and the Law in the Breast Implant Case 34 (W.W.
Norton & Co. 1997) (1996).
8Anna Wilde Mathews, A Second Chance for Silicone Implants: FDA Panel Recommends Approval for Cosmetic Breast
Surgery, But Some Doctors Are Cautious, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 2003, at D1.
9Institute of Medicine, supra note 5, at 20.
10Id. at 31.
11Id. at 32.
12Institute of Medicine, supra note 5, at 31.
13Id. at 31-32.
14Id. at 20.
5and reconstruction patients. As a result, when the FDA imposed a ban on the marketing and manufacture of
silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants in 1992, its decision alarmed substantial numbers of potential and current
implant recipients and added to growing wave of concern regarding the safety of breast implants. Although
implants had been on the market for close to forty years by the time of the FDA’s decision, very little
regulatory action had been taken to require safety and eﬃcacy data from implant manufacturers. Given the
popularity of the procedure, it is not surprising that the FDA’s ban on silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants in
1992 created a strong reaction in both the regulatory and legal spheres. However, few could predict that the
ban would result in Dow Corning’s bankruptcy in 1995, several multi-million dollar settlement plans with
implant manufacturers, thousands of product liability suits, and a moratorium on silicone breast implants
that continues today.
A.
Early Uses of Silicone
Since the late 1800s, individuals have injected or implanted foreign substances into a woman’s body to
augment or reconstruct her breasts.15 The ﬁrst recorded breast augmentation procedure occurred in Germany
in 1895 and involved the removal of fat from a non-cancerous tumor that was subsequently surgically re-
inserted into a woman’s breasts.16 Experimentation with paraﬃn injections began in 1889 and in the early
to mid-1900s, “surgeons” tried injecting a woman’s breasts with a variety of other substances, including
15Institute of Medicine, supra note 5, at 21.
16Julie M. Spanbauer, Breast Implants as Beauty Ritual: Woman’s Sceptre and Prison, 9 Yale J.L. & Feminism 157, 172
(1997).
6ivory, glass balls, ground rubber, and ox cartilage.17 These early implants were unsuccessful, however, and
were not pursued seriously.18
In the 1930s, scientists developed silicone, a synthetic polymer consisting of silicon, oxygen and carbon
side chains.19 The material remained inert after being placed in the body and patients easily tolerated the
substance.20 Further, silicone did not degrade after insertion into the human body and demonstrated a
resistance to bacterial contamination.21 Given these properties, surgeons recognized the potential uses of
silicone in medical procedures and devices.22 The FDA approved the injection of medical-grade silicone for
soft-tissue (excluding breast) augmentation for experimental use in the United States under an FDA inves-
tigational new drug (IND) ten-year exemption for Dow Corning in 1965.23 Although the FDA has never
approved the marketing of liquid silicone injections for any cosmetic purpose, currently over 500 medical
products contain measurable amounts of silicone (including facial implants, coating for needles and plastic
syringes, and methods for the intravenous, intraarterial and gastrointestinal administration of nutrients or
drugs).24
Despite the lack of FDA approval, however, doctors experimented with liquid silicone injections for breast
augmentation. The ﬁrst reported attempt occurred during World War II, when Japanese prostitutes injected
silicone directly into their breast tissue in an attempt to satisfy American servicemen stationed in Japan.25
The silicone, however, often contained contaminants that generated a severe inﬂammatory reaction and in-
17Institute of Medicine, supra note 5, at 21.
18Id.
19Debra L. Worthington, Merrie Jo Stallard & Joseph M. Price, Clearing Away the Junk: Court-Appointed Experts, Scien-
tiﬁcally Marginal Evidence, and the Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, 56 Food & Drug L.J. 227, 234 (2001); Snyder, supra
note 6, at 135.
20Angell, supra note 7, at 36.
21Id.
22Id.
23Institute of Medicine, supra note 5, at 22.
24Id. at 23.
25Angell, supra note 7, at 36.
7fected both the breast tissue and the surrounding tissues to which the gel migrated after injection.26 The
individuals who performed the procedure often used contaminated needles, further increasing the woman’s
risk of infection.27 Furthermore, it became common practice to add irritants like olive oil to the silicone
injection to minimize silicone migration to surrounding soft tissue areas.28 Although the irritant localized the
silicone in the breast by creating more scar tissue, the scarring could become severe enough to create painful
tumor-like lumps around the breast.29 The injection also handicapped breast cancer detection because in-
jected breasts are full of lumpy silicone deposits that interfere with physical examination and mammography
exams.30 In spite of these problems, however, the use of silicone injections increased in popularity and by
the 1960s had spread to the Unites States.31
B.
Introduction of Silicone Implants
Although early uses of silicone injections clearly generated signiﬁcant safety concerns, scientists and doctors
continued to experiment with new methods of silicone breast augmentation. In 1962, Dr. Fram Gerow and
Dr. Thomas Cronin developed silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants for Dow Corning.32 The company marketed
the implant, which consisted of a silicone envelope containing silicone gel, as an improvement over silicone
injections because the envelope supposedly minimized inﬂammatory responses and reduced gel migration.33
26Id. at 38.
27Id. at 36
28Id. at 38.
29Id.
30Institute of Medicine, supra note 5, at 23.
31Angell, supra note 7, at 36.
32Snyder, supra note 6, at 136.
33Angell, supra note 7, at 39.
8The most recent silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants have the same basic design as those introduced in the
1960s: a silicone rubber shell made of polysiloxane(s), such as polydimethylsiloxane and polydiphenylsilox-
ane, which is ﬁlled with a ﬁxed amount of silicone gel.34
After the introduction of silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants in the 1960s, silicone became the dominant implant
ﬁller for the next thirty years. Prior to the FDA’s ban on silicone gel-ﬁlled implants in 1992, approximately
97% of women who underwent breast implant surgery chose to have silicone gel-ﬁlled implants.35 Although
manufacturers began to oﬀer saline-ﬁlled breast implants as an alternative to silicone, the majority of women
still preferred the silicone gel models. In addition to the relatively unnatural consistency of single-envelope
saline implants, saline implants sometimes spontaneously emptied after surgery.36 Moreover, unlike pre-ﬁlled
silicone gel implants, the majority of saline implants are not pre-ﬁlled and have the potential to be either
over-ﬁlled (and therefore too hard) or under-ﬁlled (and therefore crumple and cause wrinkles in the skin).37
Thus, in countries where silicone implants have wider approval, manufacturers report that more than 90%
of patients choose them over saline versions.38
34Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for Saline, Silicone Gel, and Alternative Breast Implants: Guidance for Industry
and FDA, 4 (Feb. 11, 2003) at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/1354.html [hereinafter FDA Guidance].
35Angell, supra note 7, at 44.
36Angell, supra note 7, at 44.
37Id. A saline-ﬁlled breast implant has a silicone rubber shell made of polysiloxane(s), such as polydimethylsiloxane and
polydiphenylsiloxane, which is inﬂated to the desired size with sterile isotonic saline. There are three types of saline-ﬁlled
breast implants. Type one is a ﬁxed volume implant that is intraoperatively ﬁlled with the entire volume of saline via a valve.
Type two is an adjustable volume implant that is intraoperatively ﬁlled with saline via a valve and has the potential for further
postoperative adjustment of the saline. Type three is a pre-ﬁlled saline implant. FDA Guidance, supra note 34, at 3-4.
38Mathews, supra note 8.
9II.
Regulation of Medical Devices
Although silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants were introduced into the US market in the early 1960s, the FDA
did not have a statutory basis to regulate silicone breast (or other) implants until Congress enacted the 1976
Medical Device Amendments (the 1976 Amendments) to the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (the 1938
Act).39 Under the 1906 Federal Food and Drugs Act, Congress only granted the FDA authority to regulate
food and drugs. The agency did not obtain jurisdiction over medical devices until 1938, and, because it only
received limited authority over devices, the agency did not devote much resources to device regulation.40
Consequently, the FDA did not seriously begin to regulate medical devices until the 1976 Amendments to
the 1938 Act. As a result, medical devices went virtually unregulated for close to forty years after Congress
vested the FDA with the authority to regulate medical devices. It is therefore necessary to examine the
silicone breast implant controversy within this regulatory context in order to better understand the FDA’s
delay in responding to concerns regarding silicone implants, and the corresponding litigation that emerged
with the implants on the market.
3921 U.S.C. §360(c) (1996).
40See Richard A. Merrill, Symposium on Regulating Medical Innovation: The Architecture of Government Regulation of
Medical Products, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1753, 1800 (1996).
10A.
1976 Medical Device Amendments
Congress ﬁrst granted the FDA authority over the regulation of medical devices under the 1938 Act. The
1938 Act, however, only provided the FDA with very limited regulatory power and the agency was restricted
to monitoring adulterated and misbranded medical devices.41 The 1938 Act did not authorize the FDA to
require that a manufacturer demonstrate either the safety or the eﬀectiveness of its devices.42
By the 1970s, increasingly complex medical devices began to dominate the market, and it became apparent
to regulators, health care professionals and manufacturers that the existing framework for regulating medical
devices was inadequate.43 In 1976, in response to these growing concerns, Congress amended the 1938 Act to
provide the FDA with greater authority to regulate the safety of medical devices. The 1938 Act, as further
amended by the Safe Medical Device Act (SMDA) of 1990 and the FDA Modernization Act (FDAMA) of
1997, provides for the regulation and classiﬁcation of medical devices intended for human use according to
their relative degree of safety and eﬀectiveness.44
The 1976 Amendments established three categories (classes) of medical devices depending on the regulatory
controls needed to reasonably establish the device’s safety and eﬀectiveness. Class I devices must meet the
requirements of general controls, such as premarket notiﬁcation, listing of device types, and the registration
of manufacturing facilities.45 Class I devices are subject to the least burdensome restrictions. Class II devices
41Merrill, supra note 40, at 1803.
42Id.
43Id. at 1806.
4421 U.S.C. §360(c) (1996).
4521 U.S.C. §360(c)(1)(A) (1996).
11are those devices for which general controls are insuﬃcient by themselves to provide reasonable safety and
eﬀectiveness assurances.46 Thus, Class II devices are also subject to special controls, such as performance
standards, postmarket surveillance, clinical data requirements, and labeling and tracking requirements.47
Finally, Class III devices are those for which insuﬃcient information exists to determine whether general and
special controls are adequate to provide safety and eﬀectiveness assurances.48 These devices are regulated
through well-controlled studies and case histories that are structured to provide valid scientiﬁc evidence of
safety and eﬀectiveness.49
On the advice of its Independent General and Plastic Surgery Devices Panel, the FDA placed implants in a
category requiring general controls and performance standards. By grandfathering the implants under the
new provisions of the 1938 Act, implant manufacturers were not required to test the implants or apply for
marketing applications prior to selling their product.
B.
FDA Regulation of Silicone Breast Implants
Beginning in the 1980s, concerns surfaced that silicone might be associated with cancer, and reports of
connective tissue diseases and less deﬁned systemic complications in women with silicone injections and
implants began to appear. The ﬁrst major report of the possible link between silicone and connective tissue
4621 U.S.C. §360(c)(1)(B) (1996).
47Id.
4821 U.S.C. §360(c)(1)(C) (1996).
49Id.
12diseases originated in Japan and involved direct injections of liquid paraﬃn or silicone into the breasts.50
Subsequently, in 1982, an Australian report identiﬁed connective tissue disease in three women who had
silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants.51 During that same year, a plaintiﬀ ﬁled the ﬁrst multimillion-dollar
lawsuit alleging that implants caused systemic disease.52
The ﬁrst multimillion-dollar award to a plaintiﬀ in a breast implant product liability litigation suit occurred
three years later in Stern v. Dow Corning Corp.53 In Stern, the plaintiﬀ received silicone breast implants as
part of breast reconstruction surgery following a bilateral mastectomy.54 The plaintiﬀ developed rheumatoid
arthritis and sued Dow Corning, the implant manufacturer, on strict liability and breach of warranty claims;
the California jury awarded $7 million in damages, including $1.5 million in punitive damages.55 After Dow
Corning appealed the verdict, the plaintiﬀ settled out of court for an undisclosed amount.56
In 1982, in response to mounting pressure regarding the safety of silicone implants, the FDA proposed and,
on June 24, 1988, formally implemented a classiﬁcation of silicone breast implants in a category (Class III)
requiring stringent safety and eﬀectiveness controls.57 Under the 1976 Amendments, a Class III device may
be lawfully marketed as long as the device is the subject of a premarket notiﬁcation (PMN) to the FDA
that demonstrates it is “substantially equivalent” to a preenactment device, a premarket approval appli-
cation (PMA), or a reclassiﬁcation petition.58 Manufacturers of a preenactment Class III device (a device
for which general controls are not suﬃcient to establish safety and eﬀectiveness) are not required to obtain
50Marcia Angell, Shattuck Lecture—Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants: The Interplay of Medical Science, the
Law, and Public Opinion, 334 New Eng. J. Med., 1513-18 (June 6, 1996).
51Angell, supra note 50, at 1513-18.
52Id.
53Snyder, supra note 6, at 165 (citing Stern v. Dow Corning Corp., No. C-83-2348-MMP (N.D. Cal. 1985)).
54Id.
55Id.
56Id.
57On June 24, 1988, FDA issued a ﬁnal rule classifying the silicone gel-ﬁlled breast prosthesis into class III. 21 C.F.R. §
878.3540 (1988). The FDA issued a similar rule classifying silicone inﬂatable (saline-ﬁlled) breast implants into Class III. 21
C.F.R. § 878.3530 (1988).
5821 U.S.C. §360(c) (1996).
13FDA approval of the device’s safety and eﬀectiveness until the FDA promulgates a regulation requiring such
approval.59 Thus, on January 6, 1989, the FDA published a notice of intent to require pre-market ap-
proval applications for silicone implants.60 At approximately the same time, Public Citizen (Ralph Nader’s
consumer group) petitioned former FDA commissioner Frank Young to ban silicone breast implants and
criticized the FDA’s delay in formally implementing its safety and eﬀectiveness data requirements.61
1.
Inﬂuence of Media
In the midst of this heightened scrutiny, the news media began to focus its attention on the breast implant
controversy and contributed to the general panic and paranoia surrounding the safety of breast implants.
Although no large epidemiological studies demonstrating a link between breast implants and connective
tissue or autoimmune diseases had been published, the media presented stories describing individual breast
implant patients with diseases as though the link had been established. For example, in 1990, Connie Chung
sensationalized the implant controversy on her show, Face to Face with Connie Chung; Chung interviewed
women who claimed that their breast implants gave them autoimmune disorders and conveyed the message
that implants were dangerous devices.62 In her assessment of the silicone breast implant litigation, Marcia
Angell, M.D. (Executive Editor of the New England Journal of Medicine) criticized Chung for “implicitly
[blaming] the FDA for permitting such risky products to be sold.”63 Angell argued that Chung terriﬁed
59Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 753 (University Casebook Series ed.,
Foundation Press, 2nd ed. 1991).
6054 C.F.R. § 550 (1989).
61Angell, supra note 7, at 53.
62Id.
63Angell, supra note 7, at 54.
14thousands of women into believing that their implants were walking time bombs.64 After the broadcast
aired, physicians reported an “avalanche” of calls from asymptomatic women who were concerned about the
safety of their implants.65
In a review of all the news segments on ABC, NBC, and CBS from December 1990 to 1992, researchers
identiﬁed a trend among the media of presenting stories that sensationalized the dangers of silicone breast
implants.66 The study revealed that 71% of the 60 television news segments examined had an overt negative
bias against the implants and only 1 of the segments had a positive bias.67 Moreover, the review indicated
that the media tended to trivialize the beneﬁts of undergoing implant surgery, while reporting safety claims
less dramatically and less frequently than reports of implant dangers.68
The dramatic reporting of the dangers of breast implants and mounting concerns regarding the lack of FDA
regulation of the devices undoubtedly contributed to general public perceptions about the safety of silicone
breast implants. Given the nature of the overwhelming negative portrayal of the implants in the media, it
is very likely that many people overestimated the possibility that the alleged link between breast implants
and systemic disease was real.
64Id.
65Debra L. Worthington, Merrie Jo Stallard, Joseph M. Price, Peter J. Gross, Hindsight Bias, Daubert, and the Silicone Breast
Implant Litigation, 8 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 154,165 (June 2002) [hereinafter Worthington] (citing M.L. Vanderford &
D.H. Smith, The silicone breast implant story: Communication and Uncertainty (Erlbaum 1996)).
66Id.
67Id.
68Id.
152.
FDA’s Ban
Amidst this growing controversy, David Kessler took over as FDA commissioner in 1991, and, on April 10,
1991, the FDA required manufacturers to complete a PMA for silicone breast implant devices to be ﬁled
with the agency within ninety days.69 To date, an approved PMA is still required for marketing breast
implant devices.70 By the time the deadline arrived, however, only four of the major manufacturers, Mentor
Corporation, McGhan Medical Corporation, Dow Corning Corporation, and Bioplasty, Inc., had submitted
the required PMA.71 On August 22, 1991, the FDA determined that the PMA applications submitted by the
manufacturers were insuﬃcient, and on September 26, 1991, the FDA required the dissemination of infor-
mation about the risks associated with breast implants to patients.72 In November 1991, the FDA convened
another advisory panel and the members concluded that the manufacturers had failed to provide adequate
information regarding the safety and eﬀectiveness of their implants; nevertheless, the panel unanimously
recommended that the FDA permit the implants to remain on the market.73
One month later, on December 13, 1991, a jury awarded the largest verdict in a breast implant case (at the
time). In Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., the plaintiﬀ, Mariann Hopkins, underwent a bilateral subcuta-
neous mastectomy for severe ﬁbrocystic disease in 1976 and, during reconstructive surgery, received silicone
gel implants manufactured by Dow Corning.74 In March 1979, Hopkins was diagnosed with mixed connec-
tive tissue disease, a rheumatological disorder characterized by symptoms such as arthritis, extreme fatigue
6956 C.F.R. § 14620 (1991).
70FDA issued a proposed rule requiring a PMA for saline-ﬁlled implants on January 8, 1993. 58 C.F.R. § 3436 (1993). On
August 19, 1999, FDA required a PMA for these devices to be ﬁled with the Agency within 90 days. 64 C.F.R. § 45155 (1999).
To date, an approved PMA is required for marketing. Id.
71Institute of Medicine, supra note 5, at 30-31.
72Id.
73Angell, supra note 7, at 55.
74Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1994).
16and weakness.75 In January 1986, Hopkins discovered that one of her implants had ruptured.76 In 1988,
Hopkins sued Dow Corning, alleging fraud, strict products liability and breach of expressed and implied
warranty.77 The jury found Dow Corning liable for $840,000 in compensatory damages and $6.5 million in
punitive damages.78 Dow appealed the verdict.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the jury verdict and found that the scientiﬁc testimony submitted by
Hopkins’s experts was based on accepted scientiﬁc techniques and literature.79 Further, the court found that
“Dow’s conduct in exposing thousands of women to a painful and debilitating disease, and the evidence that
Dow gained ﬁnancially from its conduct” might be considered in determining a punitive damage award.80
The court also found a substantial award to be appropriate because Dow was aware of possible defects, knew
that long-term studies of implant safety were needed and continued to market its implants as safe despite
this knowledge.81 At no point during the trial, however, did Hopkins present reliable epidemiological or
toxicological data demonstrating an association between breast implants and connective tissue diseases.
In response to FDA pressure after the trial, Dow released several “incriminating” documents that had been
submitted during the Hopkins litigation. The evidence indicated that Dow rushed the development of its
implants and failed to adequately test their safety prior to marketing them to consumers.82 A member
of Dow’s Mammary Task Force expressed concerns about possible gel bleed and Dow allegedly ignored
proposed design modiﬁcations that may have reduced the likelihood of leakage.83 Moreover, Dow instructed
its salesmen to wash the implants with soap and water and to “dry with hand towels as the implants become
75Id. at 1118.
76Id. at 1118-19.
77Id. at 1119.
78Id. at 1118.
79Id.
80Id. at 1127.
81Id.
82Hopkins, 33 F.3d 1116 at 1119.
83Id.
17oily after being handled and [bleed] on the velvet in the showcase.”84
Subsequently, on January 6, 1992, the FDA announced a voluntary moratorium on silicone breast implants,
requesting that surgeons stop inserting silicone implants and manufacturers stop supplying them.85 Kessler
also reconvened the advisory panel to consider the evidence submitted by Dow Corning regarding the im-
plants’ safety. Although the evidence did not demonstrate any link between connective tissue disease and
breast implants (the original basis for the Hopkins litigation), the FDA used the documents to bolster its
concerns regarding implant safety. When the panel met on February 18, 1992, amidst even more intense po-
litical pressure and media publicity, the members recommended that silicone gel-ﬁlled implants be removed
from the market in all but very highly limited conditions.86
On April 16, 1992, Kessler, citing the absence of safety and eﬀectiveness data, followed the advice of his
advisory panel and restricted the use of silicone gel-ﬁlled implants to clinical observation study participants,
most of whom received implants for breast reconstruction.87 Although the FDA was careful to acknowledge
that the ban did not reﬂect any evidence of an associated risk between the devices and disease, the agency
concluded that the implant manufacturers failed to provide suﬃcient positive safety evidence.88 In approving
the ban, Kessler noted, “caveat emptor has never been – and never will be – the philosophy at the FDA.”89
The decision provided for three stages for implant availability. During the ﬁrst stage, the implants would
be available to patients with temporary breast tissue-expanders awaiting permanent reconstructive surgery,
patients undergoing reconstructive surgery at the time of mastectomy, and patients with urgent medical
84Id.
85Snyder, supra note 6, at 161.
86Id.
87David A. Kessler, The Basis of the FDA’s Decision on Breast Implants, 326 New Eng. J. Med., 1713-15 (June 18, 1992).
By this time, all U.S. companies except Mentor Corporation and McGhan Medical Corporation had withdrawn from the market.
Id.
88Id.
89Id.
18reasons (such as the rupture of a device already in place).90 During the second stage, the implants would
be available to those with a certiﬁed medical need under the extended-availability protocols of the public-
health-need provisions of the 1938 Act.91 Finally, during the third stage, the implants would be available in
carefully controlled clinical trials (with the number of participants limited to the minimum number required
by the study).92
III.
Responses to the FDA’s Ban
The increasing litigation and media coverage surrounding the safety of silicone breast implants had already
begun to inﬂuence, and possibly mislead, public perception regarding the riskiness of the devices. The FDA’s
decision to ban silicone breast implants exacerbated these safety concerns, even though no scientiﬁc studies
had established a link between the implants and the alleged connective tissue diseases. The decision appeared
to conﬁrm the unsubstantiated belief held by many women that breast implants were likely to cause serious
autoimmune disorders, despite the lack of strong supporting evidence. For example, a group of researchers
measured women’s attitudes toward their breast implants before and after the FDA’s decision.93 After the
FDA moratorium, respondents’ overall satisfaction with their augmentation dropped from 98% to 71% and
the women were more likely to express concerns about autoimmune diseases.94 Moreover, most participants
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19found media reports about the implants, the majority of which were negative, to be accurate.95
Similarly, a random telephone survey in New York City conducted in 1996 to determine potential jurors’
opinions of breast implants revealed that 90% of the 235 respondents believed that the FDA imposed the ban
because of evidence that silicone caused disease, despite the FDA’s statement to the contrary.96 Moreover,
85% of those interviewed believed that silicone is “somewhat likely” or “very likely” to cause illness or disease
if it gets into a woman’s system.97
A.
Breast Implant Opponents
In addition to increasing misperceptions about the inherent dangers and risks associated with silicone breast
implants, the decision to ban silicone breast implants from the US market left the FDA open to criticism
from both sides of the implant controversy. On the one hand, those who thought that no woman should have
been exposed to the devices as long as their safety and eﬀectiveness had not been demonstrated criticized
the FDA for waiting close to twenty years to regulate breast implants under the 1976 Amendments. For
example, a 1993 Congressional subcommittee criticized the FDA for ignoring warnings for more than twelve
years about the need to regulate silicone implants, ignoring concerns among the scientiﬁc community since
1975 about the risk of connective tissue/autoimmune disorders, and allowing manufacturers to operate for
95Id.
96Worthington et.al., supra note 19, at 236-237.
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20years without providing proof of safety to the FDA.98
However, although the FDA did delay in promulgating regulations regarding breast implants in general (and
silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants in particular), broad criticisms of the FDA’s failure to act earlier than
1992 are too sweeping and fail to consider the FDA’s statutory constraints. As discussed earlier in this
article, Congress restricted the FDA’s ability to regulate medical devices under the 1938 Act to monitoring
adulterated and misbranded devices; the agency did not have the authority to require implant manufacturers
to submit safety and eﬀectiveness data for more than fourteen years after implants were introduced in 1962.
Moreover, at the time of the 1976 Amendments, the FDA faced the overwhelming task of classifying pre-
and post-enactment devices as either Class I, II or III devices while simultaneously developing regulations
to implement and interpret the 1976 Amendments. The process took more time and resources than either
Congress or the agency anticipated.99 As a result, the FDA paid little attention to pre-market approval
applications or pre-enactment devices that had been in use for years prior to the 1976 Amendments.100
Although many devices on the market theoretically required classiﬁcation as Class III devices, many back-
logged devices remained on the market without further FDA review because the FDA focused its resources
on classifying recently introduced medical devices. Once the FDA received reports of a link between im-
plants and autoimmune diseases, the agency proposed classifying silicone implants as Class III devices and
demanded safety data from manufacturers.101
Despite these actions, however, it is clear that the FDA did delay in regulating silicone breast implants. It
98Snyder, supra note 6, at 133 n.152.
99Merrill, supra note 40, at 1812-13.
100Id.
101See supra, note 57.
21took the agency more than six years to formally classify implants as Class III devices and to require man-
ufacturers to conduct safety and eﬀectiveness testing. Although the link between implants and connective
tissue disease has been largely unsubstantiated, the FDA contributed to the mass litigation and hysteria
surrounding the implants’ safety by failing to require scientiﬁc testing of the implants sooner.
B.
Breast Implant Proponents
On the other side of the controversy, proponents of the use of silicone breast implants opposed the FDA’s
ban as an interference with a woman’s ability to weigh the risks against the personal beneﬁts of undergoing
implantation.102 For example, in her response to the FDA’s decision, Marcia Angell argued that the decision
would increase the fears of women who already had silicone breast implant surgery in a manner that would
be disproportionate to the apparent risks of implantation; the decision would be “widely seen as oﬃcial
conﬁrmation that breast implants are dangerous, despite Kessler’s assertion that it simply reﬂects a lack
of evidence.”103 Moreover, Angell argued that the decision ignored the background social context, which
regularly allows individuals to take risks such as smoking and drinking to excess.104 The ban aﬀected
thousands of women who would otherwise undergo breast implant surgery each year; individuals opposed to
the ban, such as Angell, argued that the FDA’s actions constrained the ability of these women to choose the
surgery without identifying any substantiated risk of disease associated with the implants.
102See Angell, supra note 5.
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22This argument has some merit because the FDA failed to explicitly examine the positive beneﬁts associated
with silicone breast implant surgery in its decision to ban the devices. Despite the high prevalence of silicone
gel implants, neither the FDA nor the media made any substantial arguments discussing the perceived
beneﬁts of breast implants.105 The FDA has never required that a drug or device be entirely risk-free (an
impossibly high standard). Instead, the agency has always required that the beneﬁts of a regulated device
exceed the calculated risks of that device so that it is more desirable to have the device in the marketplace
than not.106
It is unrealistic to presume that thousands of women undergo a potentially painful and risky procedure
without anticipating somewhat substantial beneﬁts. In many cases, it may be diﬃcult to quantify or artic-
ulate the beneﬁts of surgery because they are both personal and unique to each woman’s situation.107 Such
diﬃculties, however, do not justify entirely dismissing the positive beneﬁts of implantation. By refusing to
recognize any positive beneﬁts associated with silicone implants for breast augmentation, Kessler may be
holding implants to an “impossibly high standard: since there are no beneﬁts, there should be no risks.”108
This does not mean, however, that the perceived beneﬁts of implantation should automatically trump legiti-
mate safety concerns articulated by the FDA. As of 1991, a manufacturer is required to submit a pre-market
approval application prior to marketing a breast implant device. Although the FDA gave implant manufac-
turers ninety days to submit safety data, even after the years of FDA regulatory delay the manufacturers
still failed to meet this requirement. If the FDA had failed to take further regulatory action in the absence of
adequate safety data, the agency would arguably have sent the message that manufacturers of grandfathered
devices would be entirely free to market those devices without the FDA’s approval absent evidence of con-
105Id.
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23crete harms. As a policy matter, it would be imprudent to provide such a regulatory shield to manufacturers
when the purpose of the FDA is to protect the average consumer. Moreover, although subsequent epidemi-
ological data fails to establish a link between connective tissue diseases and silicone breast implants, there
are still signiﬁcant risks associated with breast implantation (such as implant rupture, capsular contracture,
and other local complications).
The exception to the FDA’s ban for reconstructive surgery patients who may be able to receive silicone
implants as part of clinical trials, however, raises additional concerns. If the FDA is concerned about the
safety and eﬀectiveness of the devices, then it seems startling to allow the devices to be inserted in patients
who are more susceptible to complications due to their weakened immune systems. A woman recovering
from a mastectomy for breast cancer is more likely to be physically vulnerable than a women merely seeking
augmentation surgery. Instead of operating solely as a protective mechanism for women contemplating breast
surgery, the ban seems to reﬂect a public policy preference against breast augmentation surgery. Kessler
indicated that, “as a society, we are far from according cosmetic interventions the same importance as a mat-
ter of public health that we accord to cancer treatments.”109 Even if that is the case, it does not justify the
FDA dismissing any discussion of the beneﬁts of silicone breast augmentation. Kessler may dis-prefer breast
implants for purely augmentation purposes; such a policy distinction, however, should not be couched as a
safety concern justifying a FDA ban on a medical device. Without further safety information (presumably
from manufacturers who have the greatest ability to test the devices and independent research groups who
have no ﬁnancial stake in the test results), it remains unclear whether the FDA should have banned silicone
breast implants.
109Kessler, supra note 87, at 1713.
24C.
Federal Multi-District Litigation
The FDA’s decision to ban silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants provided support to the growing momentum of
claims by breast implant recipients of a link between silicone implants and disease. Although the decision
did not identify any substantial risk associated with breast implants, it helped fuel the growing number of
product liability lawsuits alleging a link between implants and connective tissue diseases. More than 400,000
cases were ﬁled in federal and state courts after the FDA’s decision in 1992, and Dow Corning claimed that
20,000 lawsuits were ﬁled against the company alone in just the two years following the FDA’s ban.110
In response to the overwhelming number of cases ﬁled in federal courts throughout the country, in June
of 1992 the Multi-District Litigation Panel referred all silicone breast implant cases on federal court dock-
ets to Judge Samuel C. Pointer, III, in the Northern District of Alabama.111 The Panel determined that
centralization of the many cases awaiting litigation was appropriate to conserve party resources and avoid
duplication.112
In December of 1993, Judge Pointer provisionally dismissed Dow Corning’s parent companies, Dow Chem-
ical Co. and Corning, Inc., as defendants in the multi-district litigation (MDL) because he could ﬁnd no
evidence that the contacts between the parent and subsidiary companies arose to a level of manipulation and
control that would require piercing the corporate veil.113 However, the court retained the right to return the
defendants to the MDL if any of the parties introduced new evidence of the parent companies’ involvement
110Laura L. Hooper, Joe S. Cecil, Thomas E. Willging, Assessing Causation in Breast Implant Litigation: The Role of Science
Panels, 64 AUT Law & Contemp. Probs. 139, 142 (Autumn 2001); See also Angell, supra note 50.
111In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, MDL-926, 793 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ala. 1992).
112Id. at 1100
113In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, MDL-926, 837 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 2, 1993).
25in the breast implant controversy.114
On September 1, 1994, Judge Pointer approved a proposed $4.25 billion global class settlement, with Dow
Corning, Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., and Baxter International, Inc. underwriting more than $3 billion of
the settlement fund.115 With almost 10,000 cases pending in federal court, and almost as many pending in
state court, the proposed settlement reﬂected the parties’ recognition of the limited resources of the defen-
dants, the large costs of potential further litigation, and the limited resources of the judiciary to adjudicate
individual claims.116 The settlement included a program for receiving claims over a thirty-year period, a
simpliﬁed claims procedure that did not involve adversarial proceedings or court-appointed physician exams,
a method for adding additional diseases or medical conditions to the settlement terms, and procedures for
incorporating additional opt-out rights when necessary.117
One month later, in November 1994, the MDL plaintiﬀs, alleging conspiracy and negligence claims, sought
to reinstate Dow Chemical as a defendant in the litigation.118 The plaintiﬀs argued that Dow Chemical
marketed, sold, promoted and distributed implants worldwide through a foreign subsidiary and conducted
research, testing and development of substances contained in Dow Corning’s breast implants.119 Further-
more, the plaintiﬀs argued that the parent company concealed its role in the research and development of
Dow Corning’s implants and information about the hazards of silicone.120 In April 1995, Judge Pointer
reinstated Dow Chemical Co. as a potential defendant in the MDL and found that a jury could ﬁnd the
company liable for the negligent research, testing and development of silicone.121
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26By June 1995, more than 248,000 domestic compensation applications had been ﬁled in the MDL, suggesting
that the initial amounts available for individual plaintiﬀs under the $4.25 global settlement agreement would
be signiﬁcantly decreased.122 When Dow Corning ﬁled for bankruptcy in May of 1995, the company limited
its contribution to the $2 billion it pledged toward the initial settlement agreement.123 Thus, Dow Corning’s
announcement further exacerbated the concern that individual payments under the plan would be substan-
tially decreased. In response, the court instructed the parties to restructure the fund, and when the parties
failed to reach a new agreement by September 1995, the court set aside the $4.25 billion settlement.124
Following its ﬁling of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, Dow Corning sought to remove all breast implant
cases pending against Dow Corning, Dow Chemical, and Corning Inc. to federal court and to transfer
the cases to the bankruptcy court in Michigan. In arguing for removal and transfer, the company argued
that any judgment entered against it under the MDL would directly inﬂuence its assets in bankruptcy.125
Both the district court and the bankruptcy court initially denied jurisdiction over the claims against Dow
Chemical and other non-debtors as not related to Dow Corning’s bankruptcy.126 The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, held that the lawsuits in which Dow Corning was a codefendant may be transferred to
the bankruptcy court in Michigan; the district court would still retain the right to abstain from the cases.127
At the court’s request, defendants Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., Baxter International Healthcare Co., McGhan,
Union Carbide and 3M proposed a revised settlement plan for domestic class members; the court approved
the plan in December 1995.128 Those claimants who submitted timely claims under the defunct $4.25 billion
settlement had two options under the revised plan. First, they could accept a ﬁxed payment of $10,000 to
$100,000 based on disease criteria and severity criteria outlined in the initial settlement. Alternatively, if,
122In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, MDL-926, No. CV-92-P-10000-S (June 14, 1995)
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Litigation, MDL-926, Dec. 22, 1995, at http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order27.rtf.
27within ﬁfteen years, the claimants developed conditions meeting more restrictive criteria under the revised
plan, they could potentially receive $75,000 to $250,000. Individuals who did not register under the initial
settlement would only be eligible for the second option. Women who previously opted out of the global
settlement would be allowed to rejoin the class to participate in the revised plan.129
On February 1, 1999, the court issued its ﬁnal order approving and certifying the class settlement agreement
between Inamed and its subsidiaries McGhan Medical Corporation/3M (“MMC”) and CUI Corporation
(“CUI”) and the plaintiﬀ class.130 The class included all individuals who received an Inamed breast implant
(either saline, silicone, silicone gel and/or elastomer made of silicone) prior to June 1, 1993 (whether or not
they were removed) and all spouses, parents, children, relatives and “signiﬁcant others” where warranted
by law that may have had implant-related claims. The court further certiﬁed the action as a mandatory
(“non-opt-out”) class because it found that the costs of the continued prosecution of separate claims by
individual class members would greatly exceed Inamed’s limited resources. The court noted that the $32
million settlement was substantially greater than the amount, if any, that Inamed would be able to pay
in the absence of the settlement agreement. The court also found that Inamed was only able to borrow
additional money to fund the agreement because of the existence of a negotiated settlement. The alternative
of continued litigation, therefore, would bankrupt the company.131
As a result of its bankruptcy proceedings, Dow Corning did not participate in the class action settlement;
instead, the company reached its own settlement agreement in conjunction with the bankruptcy proceedings.
In the ﬁnal agreement, approved in December 1999, the company provided $3.2 billion for women suﬀering
from implant-related illnesses.132 The amount of compensation varied depending on the claimants’ level
129Id.
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28of injury; thus, women suﬀering from scarring could collect up to $30,000 and women with more severe
symptoms could collect up to $300,000.133
IV.
Scientiﬁc Studies
The possibility that silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants may lead to adverse autoimmune reactions had been a
central allegation of the plaintiﬀs throughout the breast implant litigation. However, although the litigation
involved a variety of woman with diagnosed or suspected connective tissue diseases who claimed that their
breast implants were the cause of their disease, the plaintiﬀs’ claims were largely unsubstantiated by any
epidemiological evidence. The purely descriptive data of an association between implants and disease intro-
duced by the plaintiﬀs was of limited value in the absence of data from a comparable group of women without
implants. In order to gauge the relative risk of disease in women who have had silicone breast implants as
compared to the general population, cohort and case-control epidemiological studies were needed.
Two main types of epidemiological studies were utilized to examine the risk of connective tissue diseases in
women with silicone breast implants and the general population: cohort and case control studies. In a cohort
study, the incidence and nature of diseases in women with silicone breast implants are obtained by following
the group for a speciﬁed period of time; this data is then compared to the incidence rate with a randomly
133Id.
29identiﬁed control group of similarly situated women without breast implants. 134 In a case control study,
researchers examine women who have already been diagnosed with connective tissue disease and women
who have not been diagnosed, identify how many women in each group have silicone breast implants, and
determine if there is a signiﬁcantly higher prevalence of disease in women with implants.135
A.
Mayo Clinic Study
The ﬁrst reliable epidemiological study to determine whether breast implants are associated with connective
tissue disease was not published until June 16, 1994, two years after the FDA issued its ban on silicone
breast implants. The study was a retrospective population-based cohort study that compared the risks of a
variety of connective tissue diseases and disorders in women with and without breast implants.136 The study
examined all the women in Olmstead County, Minnesota who received a breast implant between January 1,
1964 and December 31, 1991. Of the 1840 devices implanted, 1441 (78.3%) were silicone, 95 (5.2%) were
saline, 177 (9.6%) were polyurethane, and 123 (6.7%) were a combination of silicone and saline. All 749 case
subjects were exposed to silicone because all the breast implants were contained within a silicone envelope.137
For each case subject, the control subjects were two women of the same age (within three years) from the
same population who had not received a breast implant and who underwent a medical evaluation within two
134Angell, supra note 7, at 99.
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30years of the date of implantation of the case subject.138 Moreover, two additional county residents who had
undergone mastectomies but did not receive breast implants were selected as controls for each woman who
received an implant after a mastectomy. A total of 749 women who received a breast implant were followed
for a mean of 7.8 years and 1498 community controls were followed for a mean of 8.3 years.
Among the various signs or symptoms examined, only morning stiﬀness was signiﬁcantly increased among
the women who had received a breast implant. The study concluded, therefore, that there was no association
between breast implants and the connective tissue diseases and disorders studied.139
B.
Nurses’ Health Study
At the same time as the authors of the Mayo Clinic study published their ﬁndings in the New England
Journal of Medicine, the Nurses’ Health Study Cohort was already underway. Researchers assembled the
Nurses’ Health Study Cohort in June 1976 and mailed questionnaires to all female, married registered nurses
aged 30 to 44 years old living in California, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas.140
138Id.
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31The study followed women without connective-tissue diseases in June 1976 through May 31, 1990, before
widespread media coverage of the possible association between implants and disease began. Researchers
collected information on the study participants through biennial and supplemental mailed questionnaires
and through blinded reviews of the participants’ medical records. The study deﬁned the relative risk of
connective tissue disease as the incidence rate of connective tissue disease among women with breast implants
divided by the corresponding incidence rate among women without breast implants.
Among 87,501 women who were eligible for follow-up, the researchers conﬁrmed that 516 of the participants
had deﬁnite connective-tissue diseases and 1183 had breast implants (of which 876 were silicone-gel, 170
saline). Three of the patients with deﬁnite connective tissue disease (all had rheumatoid arthritis) had im-
plants (one silicone, one saline and one double lumen). Moreover, since 1976, 5087 women reported having a
connective-tissue disease or rheumatic disorder on the biennial questionnaires. Of these women, thirty-two
had some type of breast implant, including twenty-one women with silicone gel-ﬁlled implants. 1294 women
reported signs or symptoms of a disease but did not meet the standard classiﬁcation criteria. Of these
women, seventeen had some type of breast implant and eleven had silicone gel-ﬁlled implants.
Based upon these ﬁndings, the study authors concluded that they could not ﬁnd an association between
silicone breast implants and connective-tissue diseases, as deﬁned by a variety of standardized criteria and
signs and symptoms of these diseases.141
141Sanchez-Guerrero et al., supra note 140.
32C.
Expert Panels
1.
Hall v. Baxter Healthcare
As the cases under the MDL became ready for trial, Judge Pointer returned several of them to their districts
of origin with the expectation that early trials would set benchmarks to encourage later settlement negoti-
ations. Among these cases was a group of approximately seventy cases returned to the District of Oregon
that gave rise to Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.142
Judge Jones presided over the consolidated cases and received twenty-ﬁve joint motions in limine seeking to
exclude the testimony of the plaintiﬀs’ expert witnesses at trial.143 In an eﬀort to resolve these motions,
Jones appointed an expert panel with expertise in epidemiology, immunology, toxicology, rheumatology,
and biochemistry to assist him in determining whether the experts’ testimony rested on reliable scientiﬁc
methodology.144 After the panel assessed the scientiﬁc reliability of each expert’s methods, the court sought
further assistance in determining whether the expert’s methodology and data supported his conclusions and
applied to the particular disease at issue in the case.145
The panel received scientiﬁc information through a four-day pretrial hearing on the testimony’s admissi-
bility, articles and written materials provided by the parties, and videotaped summations prepared by the
parties.146 Approximately four months after their appointment, the panel submitted individual reports,
142Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (Or. 1996).
143Id. at 1392 n.7.
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33in general suggesting that the scientiﬁc evidence used to demonstrate a causal link between implants and
disease was unreliable.147 Thus, the court found that the evidence submitted by the plaintiﬀs’ experts was
insuﬃcient to defeat the defendant’s summary judgment motion. The court stayed the order, however, until
the MDL’s National Science Panel completed its review.148 The cases settled absent any additional court
involvement.
2.
National Science Panel under MDL
In June 1996, Judge Pointer approved a motion by the National Plaintiﬀs’ Steering Committee (PSC) to
nationally appoint a single set of scientiﬁc experts under Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 706 to evaluate
the scientiﬁc evidence in the federal breast implant litigation.149 At the time of the motion, over 21,000 cases
had been transferred to the court under the MDL, and the panel (the National Science Panel) was designed
to avoid potentially redundant or conﬂicting results that might arise from multiple FRE 706 appointments by
diﬀerent courts.150 The primary function of the National Science Panel was to review, critique and evaluate
the existing scientiﬁc literature on topics relevant to the breast implant litigation.151 After making a report
of its ﬁndings, each party would then be allowed to conduct a “discovery-type” non-videotaped deposition
147Id. at 1461.
148Id.
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34of the expert.152 The experts’ testimony would then be videotaped for presentation at subsequent trials.153
A selection panel of six experts provided the court with the names of neutral, impartial experts to serve on
the National Science Panel (NSP) who would be able to communicate eﬀectively with judges and juries.154
Although the selection panel was not allowed to receive suggestions from the parties regarding the names
of potential nominees, it was authorized to receive general suggestions regarding criteria, qualiﬁcations, and
possible areas of bias or conﬂict.155 The selection panel recommended four scientists, one each in the ﬁelds
of immunology, epidemiology, toxicology, and rheumatology to form the NSP.
Despite the court’s attempts to ensure a neutral selection process for the NSP, controversy still surrounded
the ﬁnal membership appointments. On April 13, 1999, the PSC moved to vacate the court’s appointments
of the four experts who had been serving on the NSP based on allegations of bias, conﬂict of interest, and
improper conduct, primarily on the part of Dr. Tugwell (the panel’s rheumatologist).156 The PSC alleged
that Dr. Tugwell received ﬁnancial support from Bristol-Meyers Squibb and 3M Pharma Canada, silicone
breast implant manufacturers, for research unrelated to breast implants or the litigation. Although the
allegations were, for the most part, beyond factual dispute, the court concluded that a scientist may act
neutrally and objectively, even when the outcome of his research may adversely aﬀect a company that provides
funding for his other projects.157 The court therefore denied the motion and found that Dr. Tugwell did not
had a conﬂict of interest or bias, and “acted neutrally, objectively and impartially” through his service.158
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35In October 1996 and July 1997, the NSP heard testimony from experts from both sides of the litigation and
in November 1997 experts selected by the NSP presented their research to the panelists.159 By spring of
1997, the panelists had received over 2,000 documents, which counsel for each side reduced to approximately
forty of the most important documents for each side for each panel member.160 The source of reference for
the documents was not disclosed to the panelists.161
In preparing their report, the panel was asked to identify the extent to which, if any, existing studies and
research provided a reliable and reasonable scientiﬁc basis to conclude that silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants
cause or exacerbate classic or atypical connective tissue diseases.162 Further, the panelists were asked to
note any contrary opinions by individuals generally qualiﬁed in the same area of expertise to those opinions
presented in their ﬁnal report.163 In response, the panelists found that “it is our informed opinion that
the large majority of scientists in our respective disciplines would ﬁnd merit in our reviews and analyses.
Nevertheless, as in every ﬁeld of endeavor, a few individuals may ﬁnd disagreements with our statements.”164
The completed report contained over 300 pages of scientiﬁc analysis and review and included nine cohort,
nine case control, and two cross-sectional studies in its meta-analysis of the relationship between silicone
breast implants and connective tissue diseases.165 The only study to speciﬁcally address the relationship
between undiﬀerentiated connective tissue disease and breast implants found no association between the
two.166 The panel also noted that for each sign or symptom showing an association in a study, other studies
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36found no association. The panel found that the same complaint often appeared in more than one disease
category and the studies did not verify self-reports of the disease.167 Moreover, the reports did not indicate
the timing of the disease in relation to the timing of implantation and the individual studies included only
a small number of aﬀected women.168
The results of the panel’s extensive review found no association between breast implants in general, and
silicone gel implants speciﬁcally, and any of the individual connective tissue diseases, all deﬁnite connective
diseases combined, or any of the other autoimmune/rheumatic conditions examined.169 Further, the NSP
concluded that no consistent data demonstrated atypical systemic inﬂammation or autoreactive responses
in women with silicone breast implants. The panel found that “the main conclusion that can be drawn
from existing studies is that women with silicone breast implants do not display a silicone-induced systemic
abnormality in the types or functions of cells of the immune system.”170
Moreover, the report concluded that the preponderance of the data did not support claims that silicone
implants alter the incidence or severity of autoimmune diseases.171 Sjorgren’s syndrome was a possible ex-
ception because a biopsy was not performed to identify deﬁnitive cases; because the symptoms were relatively
common in any population group, the authors could not determine whether a deﬁnitive relationship existed
between implants and the disease.172 Nevertheless, the panel concluded that, from a public health perspec-
tive, “breast implants appear to have minimal eﬀect on the number of women in whom connective tissue
diseases develop and the elimination of implants would not be likely to reduce the incidence of connective-
tissue diseases.”173
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37D.
Independent Review Group
In response to growing concerns regarding the safety of breast implants, the British Minister of Health re-
quested that the country’s Chief Medical Oﬃcer undertake a review of the use of silicone gel breast implants
in the United Kingdom; the Chief Medical Oﬃcer established the Independent Review Group (IRG) to
review the evidence relating to possible health risks associated with silicone gel breast implants.174
The IRG examined case control and cohort studies conducted between 1970 and 1988 and concluded that,
if there is a risk of connective tissue disease in women with silicone breast implants, it is too small to be
quantiﬁed.175 The IRG found that the proportion of women with established connective tissue disease and
silicone breast implants is small and the risk of developing such a disease is no higher in women with silicone
breast implants than in women without implants.176
E.
Institute of Medicine
In House Report 104-659, which accompanied a 1997 appropriations bill, Congress expressed concerns about
the fragmentation of research regarding the safety of silicone breast implants and their possible relationship
174Independent Review Group, Silicone Breast Implants: The Report of the Independent Review Group 8 (July 1998).
175Id. at 23
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38with connective tissue or other autoimmune diseases.177 The Appropriations Committee requested that the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services sponsor a study of the safety of silicone breast implants by
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the National Academy of Sciences.
In response, the IOM formed a Committee on the Safety of Silicone Breast Implants (the “Committee”) to
review the past and ongoing research regarding silicone implants. The Committee included experts in the
ﬁelds of preventive and internal medicine, nursing, family and women’s health, rheumatology, clinical and
basic research, epidemiology, immunology, neurology, silicone chemistry, toxicology, breast and other cancer,
plastic surgery, and radiology or mammography.178
While preparing its report, the Committee relied on approximately 2,200-2,300 published, peer-reviewed
scientiﬁc reports, 1,000-1,100 selected industry technical reports, books, letters, opinion pieces, written
statements, and abstracts as secondary sources, and presentations by scientists, women with implants, and
other interested parties.179 Approximately 1,200 references are cited in the text of the IOM report.180 In
1999, the IOM released its report, entitled Safety of Silicone Breast Implants.
The Committee concluded that no evidence supports an alleged association between silicone breast implants
and connective tissue or other autoimmune diseases.181 In its review of the epidemiological data, the Com-
mittee observed that some of the more than 1.5 million adult women in the United States with silicone
breast implants would be expected to develop connective tissue or other systemic diseases.182 However, the
evidence reviewed in the report suggested that these diseases are no more common in women with breast
177Institute of Medicine, supra note 5, at 1.
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39implants than in the general population of women without implants.183 In fact, the report found the studies
remarkably consistent in ﬁnding no elevated risk of disease in women with silicone implants.184 Moreover,
the Committee found that there was no rigorous or convincing scientiﬁc evidence to support a link between
atypical connective tissue disease, or any new disease in women, and breast implants.185 To the contrary,
the Committee found that the epidemiological evidence indicated that there is no novel syndrome associated
with silicone breast implants.186
The IOM released its report after the Independent Review Group and the National Science Panel published
their comprehensive reviews of the literature regarding the safety of silicone breast implants. Although the
reports diﬀer to some extent in emphasis and scope, the IOM acknowledged that the reports are in sub-
stantial agreement and together “form a mutually consistent body of current informed scientiﬁc work on the
subject of health and silicone breast implants.”187 Thus, taken together, the overwhelming body of scientiﬁc
evidence has failed to ﬁnd an association between silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants and autoimmune disease.
V.
Additional Concerns Regarding Breast Implants
Although epidemiological studies have overwhelmingly been unable to demonstrate a link between silicone
183Id.
184Id. at 6-7.
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40breast implants and autoimmune diseases, there are still prevalent safety concerns associated with the de-
vices. Concerns with local complications such as capsular contractures, implant leakage and rupture, and
mammography diﬃculties still require further safety review.
For example, in a 1997 study published in the New England Journal of Medicine, researchers concluded
that local complications that require additional surgical procedures, such as capsular contractures, implant
rupture or leakage, hematoma or bleeding, infection, or chronic pain, are an important concern for women
with breast implants.188 The study examined 749 women living in Olmstead County, Minnesota who received
an implant at the Mayo Clinic between 1964 and 1991. During a mean 7.8 years of follow-up, complications
occurred in 178 (23.8%) of the women, with capsular contraction occurring in 131 women (the most frequent
complication).189
Similarly, in its 1999 report, the IOM found that local complications are still a cause for concern for sev-
eral reasons. First, complications (including reoperations, ruptures, contractures, infections and pain) occur
frequently enough to be a cause for concern and are the primary safety issues with silicone gel-ﬁlled breast
implants.190 Second, the risks associated with breast implants increase over the lifetime of the implant.
Therefore, it may be diﬃcult to precisely ascertain the long-term eﬀects of current implant models due to a
lack of quantitative data about their eﬀectiveness.191 In order to address this lack of data, the IOM suggests
that women contemplating breast implant surgery be properly informed about the risks associated with the
operation prior to undergoing the procedure.
188Sherine E. Gabriel, Michael W. O’Fallon, Leonard T. Kurland, Marcy C. Beard, John E. Woods, Joseph L. Melton III,
Complications Leading to Surgery After Breast Implantation, 336 New Eng. J. Med. 677-82 (March 6, 1997).
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41It is clear that local complications such as capsular contracture, rupture, and silicone migration may vary
with implants from diﬀerent manufacturers; the factors that account for this diﬀerence, however, remain
unclear.192 Characteristics such as diﬀerent shell composition, diﬀerent gel consistency and diﬀusion char-
acteristics, and diﬀerent gel chemical composition may be some of the factors accounting for this variability
among manufacturers.193
In addition to the diﬀerences in the incidence rates of local complications in implants from diﬀerent breast
implant manufacturers, the implant’s performance may also vary depending on when it was produced.194
There have been at least three “generations” in breast implant manufacture.195 In the ﬁrst generation (1963-
1972), dominated by Dow Corning products, the implants consisted of thick shells and gel, and exhibited
low rupture rates, high contracture rates and moderate to high gel diﬀusion rates.196 During the second gen-
eration (1972-mid 1980s), the implants had thinner shells, contained more compliant gel and exhibited high
rupture, contracture and ﬂuid diﬀusion rates.197 Finally, the most recent silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants
on the market (late 1980s to date), third generation implants, have a stronger shell with a barrier layer,
contain compliant gel, and presumably have lower rupture, gel diﬀusion and contracture rates.198 Thus, ﬁrst
generation implants had no reported ruptures, 95% of second generation implants had ruptured at 12 years,
and only 3.5% of third generation implants had ruptured by 1992.199 Similarly, reported rates of noticeable
capsular contracture dropped from approximately 40 to 60% in ﬁrst and second generation implants to only
about 10% in third generation implants.200 Although the frequency of local complications has been substan-
tial in both breast augmentation and reconstruction procedures with either saline or silicone gel implants,
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42some of the more common complications, such as rupture and contracture, may be becoming less frequent
as technology improves.201
A.
Capsular Contracture
Scarring is an inevitable result of the foreign-body reaction that occurs during breast implant surgery.202
However, although the mere presence of scar tissue around each implant (the “capsule”) in itself is not
problematic, capsular contracture can be a serious concern with breast implant surgery. Capsular contrac-
ture occurs when the ﬁbrous scar tissue that normally forms around the implant contracts and squeezes the
implant, making the breast hard, unnaturally round and painful.203 The FDA has identiﬁed four diﬀerent
levels of capsular contracture, ranging from the breast appearing soft and natural to the breast appearing
hard, painful and abnormal.204 Although the percentage of women who suﬀer from both noticeable and
unnoticeable contractures is unknown, it may be as high as 50%.205
The correction of capsular contracture ranges from the surgical removal of the implant capsule tissue to
removal of the implant itself.206 Surgeons used to perform “closed capsulotomies” to try to relieve exces-
sive contracture by forcefully squeezing the breast to rupture the scar tissue.207 However, the procedure
often also ruptured the implant envelope, thereby releasing silicone gel into the surrounding tissues; white
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43blood cells subsequently carried the newly “freed” silicone gel through the lymphatic system into the entire
body.208 Most surgeons no longer perform the procedure and, beginning in 1980, Dow Corning included a
warning against closed capsulotomy in its package inserts.209
B.
Leakage and Rupture
In addition to concerns surrounding capsular contracture, evidence of gel migration (gel “bleed”) began to
appear during the 1970s.210 Although the implant envelope remained intact, tiny molecules of the gel leaked
through the pores of the surrounding envelope and escaped into the body.211 The leakage is usually contained
within the encasing capsule of scar tissue; however, tiny particles of silicone are sometimes discovered in
nearby lymph glands.212 The silicone may also cause lumps (“granulomas”) to form in the breast, chest
wall, armpit, arm or abdomen.213
A variety of factors may cause breast implant leakage and rupture. The most common causes are the
deterioration of the implant shell with time, undetected damage at the time of surgery, shell weakness due to
a manufacturing ﬂaw, and trauma to the breast.214 Rupture may be accompanied by decreased breast size,
uneven breast appearance, pain or tenderness, tingling, swelling, or other changes in sensation.215 However,
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44many women may unknowingly experience a rupture without any symptoms (“silent ruptures”). If only a
small tear occurs, the escaping silicone gel may remain undetectable within the surrounding capsule.216
Although it is clear that some quantity of silicone breast implants rupture, the overall frequency or risk of
rupture is not known. Intracapsular rupture may be especially diﬃcult to detect; there will likely be no
corresponding dramatic change in breast size or shape because the silicone remains within the surrounding
breast capsule.217 Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) may be used to evaluate patients with suspected
rupture or leakage of their silicone gel-ﬁlled implant, but often intracapsular rupture is only discovered when
the rupture has become severe enough to require re-operation.218 Estimates regarding the frequency of
rupture range from 1% to as much as 5%; nevertheless, the exact incidence of rupture is unknown.219 The
frequency of implant rupture will depend on the manufacturer, type and model of implant; thus, organization
such as the IOM recommend controlling for these variables in any analysis of implant rupture resistance,
shell strength or rupture prevalence.220
In a FDA-sponsored study presented at the Sixth World Biomaterials Congress on May 18, 2000, study
participants (women who had their ﬁrst implant prior to 1988) responded to a telephone questionnaire in
which they described their past breast surgeries and whether their implants were found to be ruptured.221
One third of the 907 women in the study (303 women) reported that they had at least one surgery in which
their implant was removed or replaced; of these women, 171 reported that at least one of their implants was
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45found to be ruptured or leaking. However, the study is seriously limited because researchers were unable
to retrieve any medical records for nearly half of the 303 women. Moreover, surgical records were obtained
for only 85 of the women who reported a ruptured implant and only 69 of those records indicated that the
implant had actually ruptured. Finally, it is not clear what may have caused the implant ruptures that did
occur, or whether the subset of participants is representative of the entire population of women with silicone
gel-ﬁlled implants.222
Similarly, the FDA completed another questionnaire-based study of the health eﬀects of ruptured silicone
gel-ﬁlled breast implants that was published in the May 2001 Journal of Rheumatology.223 344 women with
silicone gel implants responded to a FDA questionnaire asking them about persistent symptoms such as joint
pain, swelling, stiﬀness, and fatigue and whether a doctor had diagnosed them with any of a list of connective
tissue diseases. After the questionnaire, the women underwent a MRI exam of their breasts to detect whether
their implants were ruptured. Women with MRI-diagnosed extracapsular silicone gel were 2.8 times more
likely to report that they had the soft tissue syndrome, ﬁbromyalgia. This study is also limited, however,
because women did not receive a medical examination to conﬁrm their self-reported diagnosis. Moreover, the
study does not distinguish between women who developed ﬁbromyalgia before implant surgery and women
who developed the disease after surgery.224
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46C.
Mammography diﬃculties
A necessary result of breast implants is that mammography examinations are more diﬃcult to perform.
During breast augmentation surgery, a surgeon squeezes the implant into a pocket created behind the breast
tissue so that the implant lies behind the breast and in front of the underlying muscle.225 As a result of this
placement, the implants may delay or hinder the early detection of breast cancer by obscuring the under-
lying breast tissue and/or by compressing the overlying tissue.226 Moreover, mammography requires breast
compression (hard pressure) that may increase the risk of implant rupture.227
This increased diﬃculty in conducting mammography examinations has important consequences for the de-
tection of breast cancer. If a mammogram is not performed properly, possibly due to the presence of breast
implants, the potential for delayed breast cancer diagnoses increases. 228 Although there is no evidence
that breast augmentation is associated with increasing the false-positive rate of breast cancer detection or
increasing the risk of breast cancer itself, augmentation has been shown to decrease the sensitivity of mam-
mography screening among asymptomatic women.229 Therefore, it may be important to obtain multiple
views of the breast and manipulate the implant so that the breast tissue may be viewed more eﬀectively.230
Mammograms are more diﬃcult to obtain in breast augmentation patients because the breast implant ob-
structs the passage of x-rays through the breast tissue.231 This is less of a concern for mastectomy patients
225Angell, supra note 7, at 39.
226FDA brochure, supra note 203.
227FDA brochure, supra note 203.
228See Heather Bryant & Penny Brasher, Breast Implants and Breast Cancer—Reanalysis of a Linkage Study, 332 New Eng.
J. Med. 1535-39 (June 8, 1995) (cohort study ﬁnding that the incidence of breast cancer among women who underwent breast
augmentation surgery was neither signiﬁcantly higher nor lower than that among the general population during the period of
time in which the cohort was followed).
229Diana L. Miglioretti, Carolyn M. Rutter, Berta M. Geller, Eﬀect of Breast Augmentation on the Accuracy of Mammography
and Cancer Characteristics, 291 JAMA 442-50 (Jan. 28, 2004).
230Angell, supra note 7, at 40.
231Id. at 42.
47because the breast tissue is no longer present. In contrast to breast augmentation patients, where the im-
plant is inserted behind the breast tissue, the implant is placed either behind the muscle, against the ribs, or
between layers of the muscle in women undergoing implantation after a mastectomy for breast cancer.232 As
part of the FDA’s justiﬁcation for limiting the continued use of silicone implants to reconstructive surgery
patients in its 1992 ban, the agency pointed to this discrepancy in mammography eﬀectiveness between
augmentation and reconstruction patients.233 Although breast cancer may be more readily detectable in
implant patients who no longer have breast tissue remaining, detection remains a concern for augmentation
patients.
D.
Toxicity
Toxicology studies of silicone are helpful in assessing the safety of silicone breast implants for several reasons.
First, given the potentially high incidence of gel bleed and implant rupture, it is useful to gauge the relative
toxicity of silicone in the body; since it is neither ethically nor practically feasible to test a potentially danger-
ous toxin in human subjects, toxicology studies in animals may be used to identify possible adverse health
eﬀects of silicone.234 Second, the studies may assist researchers in clarifying dose response variations.235
Similarly, given the ethical constraints limiting testing on human research participants, researchers are free
to experiment with varying doses in animals to determine potential eﬀects at very high or very low exposure
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48levels. Finally, the studies may help to identify how and under what conditions a speciﬁc substance produces
an eﬀect.236
The majority of animal studies examining the toxicity of silicone have failed to identify an adverse toxicologic
response. For example, the NSP found that toxicologic testing with silicone has occurred for almost ﬁfty
years and the majority of recent studies reaﬃrm the low systemic toxicity of silicone.237 Some animal studies
have suggested the possibility that silicone may promote systemic disease by altering the normal regulating
mechanisms of the immune system or by inducing systemic inﬂammation.238 The preponderance of the
data from specialized animal models, however, indicates that silicone implants do not alter the incidence or
severity of autoimmune disease.239
The IOM also examined the toxicity of silicone in its 1999 report. The Committee examined studies eval-
uating the carcinogenic, reproductive, mutagenic, teratologic, immunotoxic and general toxicity of silicone
compounds.240 The IOM concluded that, in its review of over ﬁfty years of toxicology studies and industry
reports, the studies of individual substances found in breast implants demonstrated no signiﬁcant substance
toxicity.241 The report noted that, although the design and methodology of some of the older toxicity
studies was somewhat deﬁcient according to current standards, the toxicological information, as a whole, is
“substantial and improving.”242 Moreover, several studies have shown that the majority of silicones remain
localized where they are deposited and do not move freely throughout the body.243 Further, low molecular
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49weight silicones, which may be slightly more mobile, are cleared from the body relatively quickly because
they have short half-lives.244 Thus, the report concluded that the “accumulating qualitative and quantitative
data on the general toxicity of silicones [...] allow a reasonable degree of conﬁdence that silicone compounds
in breast implants are not hazardous.”245
Similarly, the IRG determined that the information regarding the local and systemic toxicity, genetic and re-
productive toxicity, and carcinogenicity of silicones indicated that silicone is a “relatively bland substance.”246
The overall pattern of toxicity ﬁndings, both with regard to systemic and local actions, was consistent with
conventional responses to foreign materials and indicated no unusual or unique type of reaction.247
VI.
Current Developments
A.
INAMED Application
In the years following the FDA’s ban, McGhan Medical (now Inamed Corp.) developed a breast implant
device composed of silicone gel encased in a silicone elastomer envelope (shell). The shell consisted of
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50an inner and outer layer sandwiched around a barrier layer that was designed to impede the diﬀusion of
gel through the shell.248 By June 1998, Inamed had received FDA approval for a study of these silicone
implants in augmentation, reconstruction and revision patients.249 The prospective study, which began in
1999, involved 940 silicone breast implant patients (494 augmentation, 221 reconstruction, and 225 revision
patients). The study collected detailed local complication and eﬀectiveness data yearly and a subset of
approximately 34% of the patients underwent serial MRI screenings for silent ruptures. Consistent with
FDA guidance at the time, Inamed collected at least two years of follow-up data prior to submitting a PMA.
The study revealed a low frequency of implant rupture, low silicone toxicity rates, and relatively high levels
of patient satisfaction.250
In October 2003, an FDA advisory committee evaluated Inamed’s request to reintroduce silicone gel-ﬁlled
breast implants to the US market.251 Although Inamed’s study revealed few implant ruptures, some com-
mittee members felt that there was not enough data to accurately gauge the risks of rupture because the
study only covered a couple of years and not all participants received MRI exams.252 Nevertheless, the panel
recommended in a nine to six vote that silicone implants be allowed back into the market, but required that
Inamed meet an array of conditions, including improved patient information, doctor-education programs,
and further research into outstanding safety issues.253 In response, Inamed agreed to create new educational
materials for women who use implants, develop detailed informed consent procedures in cooperation with
the FDA, and develop physician-training programs. Further, Inamed agreed to keep a registry of women
who receive implants to provide long-term information about the status of the implants and assist women
248Clinical Summary Memorandum, Summary of Prospective Clinical Data contained in PMA #P020056, September 12,
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51in tracking their health.254
However, the advisory committee’s decision was not without controversy. Just one month after the panel
announced its recommendations, its chairman, Thomas V. Whalen, a professor of surgery at the Robert
Wood Johnson Medical School, urged the FDA to override the panel’s recommendation because of lingering
long-term safety concerns.255 In a letter to FDA Commissioner Mark McClellan, Whalen concluded that
approval of Inamed’s device would pose “threats to women that are clearly unknown” and argued that it is
“incumbent upon the FDA to demand that the manufacturer establish in a rigorous, prospective, controlled
study that these devices, despite their established breakage and leakage rates, are safe in the long term.”256
The FDA declined to comment on Whalen’s letter. However, on January 8, 2004, the FDA deferred a ﬁnal
decision on the marketing of silicone breast implants and left the current ban in place, overriding its own
advisory panel’s recommendations.257 The FDA cited a need for further information about the likelihood of
leaks and their complications and unveiled new, tougher guidelines for PMA applications.258 The decision
is clearly a setback for Inamed; although its CEO, Nick Teti, said that the company did not believe it would
be required to repeat its clinical trial, it was not apparent how the company would satisfy the FDA’s new
guidelines.259 Teti expressed concern that the whole process had become highly politicized, even though the
science supporting the marketing of implants is substantial.260 Similarly, critics of the FDA’s decision argued
that “instead of going with the science here, the FDA has sided with the fears, holding silicone implants to
ever higher and shifting standards.”261
At the same time as the US continues to place limitations on the reintroduction of silicone breast implants
into the market, the European Union has reached a diﬀerent conclusion regarding the device’s safety. In
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52February 2003, amid safety concerns, Inamed’s silicone implants were upgraded from a Class II to a Class III
device, the E.U.’s most rigorously controlled device class.262 The change triggered an approval and recerti-
ﬁcation process requiring a safety and eﬃcacy demonstration for all Class III products to be marketed after
March 1, 2004. Inamed received E.U. Class III CE Mark Approval and recertiﬁcation in February 2004.263
B.
FDA Guidance Revisions
Since 1991, the FDA has required manufacturers to demonstrate the safety and eﬀectiveness of their breast
implants prior to marketing them to consumers. However, until recent guidelines, the FDA has not clearly
speciﬁed the type, quality and quantity of data required to meet this standard. Although developing sci-
entiﬁc studies (primarily the epidemiological studies discussed above) do not substantiate allegations of an
association between silicone implants and connective tissue disease, concerns regarding implant rupture and
gel bleed, capsular contracture, and overall safety and eﬃcacy remain. Given the FDA’s current policies
curtailing the manufacture and distribution of silicone breast implants, further clariﬁcation of the FDA’s
expectations regarding safety and eﬃcacy requirements is necessary for manufacturers seeking to market
updated silicone implant models.
On January 13, 2004, the FDA issued a draft guidance document for breast implant marketing applications
for industry and the FDA staﬀ that would modify existing guidance (published in February 2003) in several
262Inamed Breast Implants Win E.U. Class III Approval, 31 Device & Diagnostic Letter, Feb. 23, 2004 [hereinafter E.U.
Approval].
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53ways. The presumable goal of the modiﬁcations is to clarify the FDA’s expectations regarding the type
and quantity of scientiﬁc data that will be required of manufacturers seeking to obtain PMA for their
implants.264 The new recommendations, included in the areas of mechanical testing, modes and causes of
rupture, clinical study information, postapproval requirements, and labeling, seek to provide further guidance
about the FDA’s PMA screening process to implant manufacturers.265
In the area of mechanical testing, the FDA is concerned about the frequency and prevalence of rupture
and gel bleed in silicone implants. At this time, as discussed earlier in this article, very little information is
available about the risk of implant rupture. Thus, the updated guidelines reﬂect a concerted eﬀort to develop
mechanical testing strategies that more accurately predict rupture rates, causes and frequencies over time.266
Similarly, the FDA introduced a new section, Modes and Causes of Rupture, in its guidance to explicitly
recommend that a manufacturer characterize the modes and causes of implant rupture over time through
retrieval studies, manufacturing processes assessments, surgical technique assessments, and comprehensive
literature reviews.267 Further, the FDA recommends the development of more accurate gel bleed tests that
mimic body conditions.268 The recommendations for both rupture and gel bleed testing echo the safety
concerns the FDA voiced in its 1992 ban of silicone implants regarding the chemical composition of silicone
and its unknown long-term eﬀects on the body.
In the area of clinical studies, the FDA allows itself fairly broad discretion to evaluate manufacturer PMAs.
For example, although the guidelines allow a manufacturer to submit a PMA after collecting and evaluating
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265Compare Draft Guidance for Industry and FDA Staﬀ – Saline, Silicone Gel, and Alternative Breast Implants, Jan. 13,
2004, at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/1239.html with Guidance for Industry and FDA Staﬀ – Saline, Silicone Gel,
and Alternative Breast Implants, Feb. 11, 2003, at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/1354.html.
266See generally, Food and Drug Administration, Draft Guidance for Industry and FDA Staﬀ – Saline, Silicone Gel, and
Alternative Breast Implants, Part 6: Mechanical Testing, Jan, 13, 2004 at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/1239.html
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54two years of clinical data, the FDA may, at its discretion, require additional submissions and testing to
evaluate the device’s safety and eﬀectiveness (particularly with regard to gel-bleed and rupture concerns).269
Moreover, in keeping with its new focus on implant rupture, the FDA recommends that a manufacturer
include the rate, frequency, and local health consequences of intracapsular, extracapsular and migrated gel
ruptures in a PMA, and provide relevant information from the published literature on issues relating to
implant rupture.270
The FDA’s goal of maintaining broad discretion over the PMA process is also apparent in its modiﬁcations
to the Postapproval Requirements section. The section clariﬁes that the FDA may exercise its statutory
authority to require post approval studies (i.e., physician follow-up), continued data collection (i.e., rupture
rates and causes), physician certiﬁcation and training programs, implant complication management, and
patient registries to continually monitor device safety and eﬃcacy.271
Finally, the Labeling section ties the modiﬁcations to the preceding sections together. In general, the agency
wants far more information about the frequency and eﬀects of implant rupture. Thus, the FDA now recom-
mends that a manufacturer include the method and frequency of rupture screening, clinical management of
ruptures, gel bleed results, and other supplemental information based on a literature review on patient and
physician labels.272
The proposed changes also reﬂect a growing awareness within the agency of the increased scientiﬁc research
and publication that has occurred in the ﬁeld of silicone gel breast implants since the 1992 ban. For example,
the guidance regarding data collection on connective tissue diseases and symptoms has been modiﬁed to indi-
cate the agency’s recognition of the substantial scientiﬁc research that has been done over the last decade.273
269See Food and Drug Administration, Draft Guidance for Industry and FDA Staﬀ – Saline, Silicone Gel, and Alternative
Breast Implants, Part 9.1: Clinical Studies, Jan. 13, 2004, at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/1239.html.
270See Food and Drug Administration, Draft Guidance for Industry and FDA Staﬀ – Saline, Silicone Gel, and Alternative
Breast Implants, Part 9.3: Safety Assessments, Jan. 13, 2004, at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/1239.html.
271See Food and Drug Administration, Draft Guidance for Industry and FDA Staﬀ – Saline, Silicone Gel, and Alternative
Breast Implants, Part 9.7: Postapproval Requirements, Jan. 13, 2004, at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/1239.html.
272Id.
273See Draft Guidance Part 9.3, supra note 270.
55Thus, the FDA recognizes that the core study of a PMA does not need to examine a potential link between
breast implants and connective tissue diseases; the agency still recommends, however, that a manufacturer
collect information on the diagnosis of such diseases as part of the overall device safety assessment.274 The
extent to which this recognition will aﬀect the agency’s review of PMAs, however, remains unclear.
Despite the agency’s recognition of scientiﬁc developments in the area of the connective tissue diseases,
the new guidelines still create a higher bar for approving future PMA requests. The modiﬁcations impose
tougher research requirements, including substantial new tests and studies regarding the risks, frequency
and eﬀects of implant rupture.
VII.
Conclusions
Silicone gel-ﬁlled breast implants entered the US market in the 1960s and were quickly embraced by both
surgeons and breast surgery patients as an eﬀective way to augment or reconstruct the breasts. However,
although the introduction of silicone implants was relatively uncontroversial, by the early 1980s reports
of potential links between the implants and connective tissue diseases began to surface. This purported
association between the implants and disease spurred thousands of lawsuits and a multi-million dollar class
settlement agreement, despite the absence of any epidemiological data to support such an association. In the
midst of this heightened controversy, the FDA faced a dilemma. If the agency chose to allow the implants
274See id.
56to remain on the market, it would exacerbate criticisms by opponents of the use of silicone breast implants
that the agency was unnecessarily delaying in acting to protect the average consumer. On the other hand,
if the agency chose to ban the implants, breast implant proponents would criticize the FDA for banning a
procedure that thousands of women might seek to undergo, without any evidence of a link between implants
and disease. The FDA chose the latter option, thereby instituting a ban on silicone breast implants that
still exists today.
It is not clear whether the FDA made the appropriate decision to ban silicone breast implants in 1992; it
is clear, however, that the decision helped stimulate both manufacturers and independent research facilities
to conduct further investigations regarding the safety of the devices. Since the FDA announced its decision,
countless epidemiological studies have determined that there is no demonstrable association between the
implants and connective tissue diseases. Moreover, groups like the IRG, the NSP, and the IOM have also
examined the risks of local complications from silicone breast implants. Although many questions regarding
the safety of the devices remain unanswered (such as rupture and leakage rates), the primary justiﬁcation
for the FDA’s ban (that silicone implants are associated with connective tissue diseases) no longer exists.
Given the changing information surrounding the implants’ safety, it no longer makes sense to maintain a
complete ban on silicone implants. Instead, the FDA should encourage further research and testing by al-
lowing manufacturers to re-enter the market.
Although implants have been shown to cause signiﬁcant local complications, these complications are not
unique to silicone gel-ﬁlled implants; instead, as the IRG concluded, “the risks to patients associated with
the use of silicone gel breast implants are no greater than for other implants.”275 The FDA has concluded
that saline breast implants do not impose a signiﬁcant enough risk to justify excluding the devices from
275Independent Review Group, supra note 174, at 27.
57the marketplace. Thus, given that no connection between autoimmune disease (or any new disorder) and
silicone implants has been established, the FDA’s justiﬁcation for the implant ban no longer serves the pur-
pose of protecting women’s health when the risks associated with those devices are no greater than freely
available saline implants. As an alternative to maintaining a complete ban on silicone implants, the FDA
should establish comprehensive informed consent procedures to reintroduce the devices into the market.
Such procedures would acknowledge both the perceived beneﬁts of breast implantation and the signiﬁcant
risks associated with the surgery.
The FDA has already made some modiﬁcations to its policies for reviewing silicone breast implant PMAs;
these changes are evident in the FDA’s recent proposals updating guidelines for manufacturers. The new
guidelines require further testing of implant rupture and gel bleed rates to obtain more comprehensive in-
formation about the risks and local complications associated with silicone implants. Moreover, as discussed
earlier in this article, in its review of Inamed’s recent PMA the FDA’s advisory committee recommended
instituting a compulsory national breast implant registry to identify short-term complications and provide
data for future long-term research studies. It is not clear, however, whether these changes will serve as a
further impediment to implant manufacturers by creating additional hurdles for regulatory approval. Such
a result would be unfortunate; instead of imposing greater restrictions on implant manufacturers, the FDA
should promote incentives for further research to properly identify implant risks.
The IRG made several proposals and recommendations for the future provision of breast implants that rec-
ognize the competing tensions between the physical and psychological beneﬁts of breast implants and the
signiﬁcant physiological concerns associated with implantation. In addition to the changes the FDA has al-
ready made, these proposals may serve as a guideline for further FDA reforms. First, the IRG recommended
that women contemplating breast implant surgery should have access to adequate information to make an
58informed decision about whether to undergo the risks inherent in implant surgery.276 Advertisements that
promote breast implant surgery should also be required to include a statement that indicates that the pro-
cedure necessarily has some risks and discloses resources where potential patients can obtain comprehensive
information about those risks.277 In addition to the risks associated with the surgery, surgeons should also
communicate the likely ﬁnancial implications of both the surgery itself and the potential follow-up treat-
ments and expenses that may be required. Prior to initiating the procedure, the woman should be required
to sign a consent form that details the risks discussed and diﬀerent implant options available.278
Second, the IRG proposed that surgeons should provide more systemic follow-up services for women who
choose to undergo silicone breast implant surgery.279 The women should be followed for a minimum of
one year, with the option of longer follow-up periods, in order to identify potential complications that
women would otherwise not choose to bring to their doctors’ attention. Moreover, in connection with the
more comprehensive provision of information discussed above, women should be given advice about how to
identify potential implant rupture and signs of capsular contracture.280
These provisions for comprehensive risk disclosure provide a mechanism to address the FDA’s concerns
regarding the local complications of silicone implants, while avoiding the draconian measure of removing the
implants entirely from the market. Most importantly, the measures oﬀer a concrete way to conﬁrm that
the woman has in fact given knowing, voluntary consent upon full disclosure of the inherent risks of the
procedure. At the time of the 1992 ban, the FDA found that many women were not adequately informed
276Independent Review Group, supra note 174, at 27.
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279Independent Review Group, supra note 174, at 28.
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59about the risks associated with breast implant surgery prior to having the surgery performed.281 In order
to make sure that women are making informed decisions, therefore, it is necessary for both surgeons and
manufacturers to provide more detailed information about the risks of local complications and the potential
costs of further surgeries. As the IOM noted in its report, informed consent will not be adequate unless
women are given information regarding the nature and relatively high frequency of local complications and
reoperations.282
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L. Rev. 705 (1997).
282See Institute of Medicine, supra note 5, at 12.
60